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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes simultaneity and endogeneity of ERM and Corporate Governance. It assesses 
quantitative relationship between Corporate Governance, ERM and value of the firm. The research results 
provide quantitative justifications for the boards to make investments in ERM and Corporate Governance 
initiatives for improved shareholder wealth.  3SLS-IV system modelling was applied on 2004-11 data of Gulf 
Cooperation Council financial institutions. Our research confirms the simultaneity and endogeneity of 
Corporate Governance, ERM and Firm Value determinants. Firm value is jointly and positively impacted by 
ERM & Corporate Governance initiatives although the impact was less significant. Unexpectedly, ERM 
initiative was significantly and negatively impacted by determinants such as intangibility, and profitability. Firm 
size was the only determinant that showed significant and positive impact on firm value. Relative to UAE the 
corporate governance mechanism was active in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman firms. Further, the 
existence of audit committees in the GCC firm’s boards and ERM adoption significantly positively impacted 
the corporate governance by 3.42% and 1.7239% respectively. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Enterprise Risk Management, Firm Value, Simultaneity, Endogeneity, 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A recent survey of global CEOs found that enterprise risk management (ERM) is a priority among more than 
one-third of CEOs (39 percent strongly agree) and their boards (38 percent strongly agree) (PwC 2008).  
Analysis of more than 1000 directors serving on the boards of top 2000 publicly traded companies through 
2009 Annual Corporate Directory survey revealed that, about 60 percent of the board members considered 
“Unknown risks” as their daunting task, and about 56 percent emphasized that the board of directors (BOD) 
must invest much more time and focus on risk management than in the past (PwC 2010). Creatively mitigating 
risk is critical to maximizing shareholder value and corporate governance (CG) requires firms to address 
various risk issues integratedly and simultaneously through enterprise risk management (ERM)1 processes 
(Yilmaz & Flouris, 2010). There is a need to shift thinking from CG as a cost or risk mitigation effort, to CG as 
a strategic goal that brings in new revenues (Pohle & Hittner, 2008).  
 
Corporate executives are "justifiably uncomfortable making a deeper commitment to ERM initiatives without a 
clear and quantifiable business case" (Sim Segal (2011)). Rightly so, Niamh and Solomon (2008) in their 
overview of corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability, placed risk management 
(as one of the mechanisms of accountability) and undertaking studies in developing economies (as a part of 
globalization) on the frontiers of CG research. 
 
Academics and industry commentators argue that ERM and CG benefit firms by decreasing earnings and 
stock price volatility, reducing external capital costs, increasing risk awareness, increasing capital efficiency, 
and creating synergies between different risk management activities (Miccolis and Shah, 2000; Gumming and 
                                                          
1 ERM is synonymous with integrated risk management (IRM), holistic risk management, enterprise-wide risk management, and strategic risk 
management. For consistency, we use the acronym ERM throughout this study. 
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Hirtle, 2001; Lam, 2001; Meulbroek, 2002; Klefmer, Lee, and McGannon, 2003; Beasley, Clune, and 
Hermanson, 2005; Beasley, Pagach, and Warr, 2008).  
 
1.1. Research problem and questions 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the joint quantitative impact of ERM and CG on firm value is scarce thus limiting 
their adoption by firms2.  This research paper therefore possibly is the first empirical research in Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC)3 to develop a conceptual framework to address the joint impact of ERM and CG 
initiatives on firm value, and validate the framework with a set of empirical data of GCC economies.  
 
 
1.1.1. Justification of the Research 
The rationale is that BOD of profit maximizing firms considers implementing ERM and CG programs jointly 
only if these initiatives increase expected shareholder wealth by increasing firm value.  
 
1.1.2. Organization of the paper 
The research study is structured as follows. Section two develops a conceptual framework to answer the 
question why in theory ERM & CG jointly add value to the firm together with relevant literature review. Section 
three develops a set of indicators of ERM & CG to quantify their joint impact on firm value. Section four applies 
the conceptual framework empirically to a sample data of fast emerging economies in GCC, discusses the 
methodology, and analyzes results. Section five concludes the research with avenues for further research. 
 
 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Value relevance of Corporate Governance Initiatives 
The value relevance for CG from an agency theory perspective is that adequate monitoring or control 
mechanisms need to be established to protect shareholders from management’s conflict of interest (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) showed that board structure is partly a function of the 
bargaining process between the chief executive officer (CEO), and the board. Theoretical work by Raheja 
(2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008), show that firm performance has a direct inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s information 
environment, proﬁt potential, and the opportunity cost of outside directors in the BOD, all of which are factors 
that may affect the corporate governance. Hence existence of risk and audit committees are the strategic 
tools/mechanisms imposed by the BOD to govern the risk exposure at the firm level. 
  
2.2 Value relevance of Corporate Governance - ERM initiatives 
ERM evolved from a narrow, insurance based view to a holistic and encompassing view of risk. In September 
2004, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) provided a model 
framework for ERM. That framework defines ERM as “a process, monitored by an entity’s BOD, management 
and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events 
that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be within its risk tolerance, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.” Nocco and Schulz (2006) argue that ERM is beneficial to most 
firms because it allows them to manage risks in a manner that avoids costly left-tail outcomes. Companies 
adopting ERM cited “the influence of the risk manager (61%), encouragement from the BOD (51%), and 
compliance with Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) guidelines (37%)” as the key factors causing their adoption 
of ERM (Kleffner et al. (2003). Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) used Chief Risk Officer (CRO) appointments to 
examine the determinants of ERM adoption.  Beasley et al. (2005) show that the presence of a CRO, board 
independence, managerial involvement, firm size and auditor type is associated with a greater stage of ERM 
adoption. Pagach and Warr (2007) show that firms that are more leveraged, have more volatile earnings and 
exhibit poorer stock market performance, are more likely to initiate an ERM program.  Additionally, they find 
that ERM is used for reasons beyond basic risk management, including offsetting CEO risk taking incentives 
and seeking improved operating performance. These studies indicate that, as the first potential source of value 
of CG from ERM, firms that engage in ERM are able to better understand the aggregate risk inherent in 
different business activities, which provides the firms with a more objective basis for resource allocation and 
improved firm value.  
 
                                                          
2 Boatright (2011) address ERM and CG as complementary tools. 
3 GCC countries include United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. 
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A second potential source of value of CG from ERM initiative arises due to improved information about the 
firm's risk profile. Outsiders are more likely to have difficulty in assessing the financial strength and risk profile 
of opaque firms that are highly complex both financially and operationally. ERM enable these opaque firms to 
better inform outsiders of their risk profile and serve as a signal of their commitment to risk management. By 
improving risk management disclosure, ERM is likely to reduce the expected costs of regulatory scrutiny and 
external capital (Meulbroek, 2002). Additionally, for banks, insurers and large business houses, the major 
rating agencies have put increasing focus on risk management and ERM specifically as part of their financial 
review. This is likely to provide additional incentives for these firms to consider ERM programs, and also 
suggest a potential value implication to the existence of ERM programs in these firms. For instance, in October 
2005, Standard & Poor's announced that with the emergence of ERM, risk management will become a 
separate, major category of its analysis. In February 2006, A.M. Best released a special report describing its 
increased focus on ERM in the rating process. Smithson and Simkins (2005) provide a thorough review of the 
literature regarding the value relevance of risk management. Although these studies considered specific types 
of hedging activity, very few studies find evidence of relationship between CG, ERM and value of the firm 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003), which is the purpose of this research paper. 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
From the perspective of CG, the key elements of successful ERM programs are (a) comprehensive and 
transcendent risk management that operates to avoid silos, and (b) senior level (preferably board level) 
involvement in risk management. It is the responsibility of the BOD and the senior management to define the 
firm’s risk tolerance and to ensure that the firm’s risk management framework includes detailed policies that 
set specific firms’ activities that is consistent with its risk tolerance and capacity. In order to determine the 
overall risk tolerance, the BOD and senior management must have an understanding of risk exposures at three 
levels: at the level of system, at the level of the firm/enterprise, and at the transaction level. These aspects are 
conceptualized in the framework in figure.1.  It is reasonable to posit that at the system level, the firm’s BOD 
strategically formulates both (A) CG initiatives and (B) ERM initiatives as elements of CG. At the firm level, the 
top-management strategizes these initiatives through creating specific instruments such as Audit Committees, 
Risk committees, and induction of independent board members for ensuring effective CG. At the transaction 
level, the firm’s operatives implement ERM initiatives to mitigate operation risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, 
leverage risk and capital risk that are faced by the firm. Together these three levels of activities effectively 
create firm value. 
Figure.1 Conceptual Framework of CG and ERM Joint Impact on Firm Value 
A.1 Audit committees       
         A. CG Initiatives  A.2 Risk committees 
  A.3 Independent board members  
 
BOD         C. Firm Value/ 
              Shareholder wealth  
 
             
    B.1 Operational risk 
           B. ERM Initiatives        B.2 Liquidity risk 
    B.3 Credit risk 
    B.4 Leverage risk 
    B.5 Capital risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
(System level) 
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RH01: ERM & CG initiatives are not jointly undertaken by the firm. That is, BOD adopts CG & ERM initiatives 
independently implying no simultaneity in formulating these initiatives.  
 
RH02: Firm value does not influence the BOD’s strategic adoption of ERM & CG joint initiatives. That is, there 
is independence between firm value and CG & ERM initiatives implying there is no endogeneity in the BOD 
initiatives. 
 
RH03:  Joint adoption of ERM & CG initiatives do not improve Firm value (FV). 
In addition to these three specific hypotheses, this research also identifies key significant determinants that 
influence ERM and CG initiatives for enhancing firm value.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Measuring ERM Initiatives  
Since ERM function is rarely observed in financial firms, and empirical evidence on ERM metric is scarce, we 
proxy ERM metric in this study as an indicator variable with ERM=1 implying adoption of ERM initiatives by 
the financial firms who have met any one of the following five conditions, and ERM=0 implying non-adoption 
of ERM initiatives.  
# Nature of condition What the condition reflects? 
1 If the financial firm has audit 
committees in the BOD  
This condition reflects active BOD where, audit committee 
monitors various risks of firms and reports to BOD for 
undertaking control measures to mitigate risks strategically. 
2 If the financial firm has derivative 
products under assets 
These conditions reflect active implementation of risk reducing 
instruments such as derivatives (like Options, Futures, SWAPs, 
off balance sheet commitments) to manage financial and 
operational risks of the financial firm. 
3 If the financial firm has derivative 
products under liabilities 
4 If the financial firm maintains a 
positive reserve ratio of non-
performance loans to gross 
loans 
This condition reflects pro-active action to manage credit risk. 
Higher the reserve ratio lower are the credit risks in the 
financial firm. 
5 If the financial firm has Tier-1 
Capital Ratio greater than 4%. 
In this condition, positive tier-1 capital adequacy as per the 
stipulations from the GCC Central Banks, imply commitment of 
management to potentially employ risk management practices 
to mitigate capital risk of the firms. 
 
4.2 Measuring Firm Value-Tobin’s Q 
Consistent with the general practice in the corporate finance literature we use Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm 
value (Boone et al (2007), Linck et al. (2008), and Lehn et al. (2009)). Lang and Stulz (1994) explain that 
Tobin's Q dominates other performance measures (e.g., stock returns and accounting measures) because, 
unlike other measures, Tobin's Q does not require risk adjustment or normalization. Furthermore, because 
Tobin's Q reflects market expectations, it is relatively free from managerial manipulation (Lindenberg and Ross, 
1981). Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006) contend that Tobin's Q is appropriate for finance companies because 
the book value of their assets is a much closer approximation of replacement costs than would be the case for 
nonfinancial firms. We measure Tobin's Q as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided 
by the book value of assets.  
 
4.3 Measuring CG 
Good CG requires the board to constantly monitor the firm to ensure growth in the firm value to protect the 
interests of the shareholders. Yermack (1996) used factors such as board size and existence of audit 
committees to measure the impact on Tobin-Q. We measure CG as the number of members in the BOD. 
We test the simultaneity and endogeneity hypotheses through simultaneous equation system using 3SLS – 
Instrumental Variable (IV) Technique4. The instrument variables generally include all of the independent 
variables in the system of equations and may include any other variable as well. In this simultaneous equation 
system, the right-hand side regressors are allowed to be the endogenous variables as well. In one equation, 
ERM is allowed to depend on firm value, CG and other control variables while in other equations, CG is allowed 
to depend on firm value and other control variables. 3SLS-IV does not assume cross equation correlation of 
                                                          
4 Endogeneity is one of the most major challenges in econometric analysis in management and much of social Sciences. Endogeneity 
can be caused by three circumstances: Omitted Variables, Measurement Error, and Simultaneity. Endogeneity issue is generally 
addressed by applying Instrumental Variables Regression. 
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error terms and it uses a set of instrumental variables for estimation purposes. In the next section, the 
conceptual framework (figure 1) is evaluated by system equations modeling. The research hypotheses are 
empirically tested with a set of data of financial institutions in GCC which are fast emerging economies 
characterized by much activity in CG, and ERM during 2004 and thereafter.  
 
4.4 Empirical Model 
The conceptual framework (figure 1) is modelled through the simultaneous system of equations of the form:  
 
Yit = Xitβit + εit , i=1,…….m, 
Where:  
Yi represents Tx1 vector of equation i = equation number 1 to 3 
Xi is a T×ki matrix of determinants in each of the three system equations 
βi is a ki×1 vector of system coefficient in each of the three system equations  
εi are T×1 vector of errors in each of the three system equations, and 
t = 1, …,T5.  
 
Equation 1 - ERM Determinants & Hypotheses 
The first equation ERMt in the system of equations is modeled as below: 
ERMt = a11 + b12 FVt + b13 CGt  + b14 LLRt + b15 CARt + b16 ROAAt + b17 MBt + b18 DGt + b19 
Sizet + b1,10 DEt + b1,11 Opaquet + b1, 12 CVNIt + b1, 13 Slackt + b1, 14 Diverset + ε1t 
 
Firm value (FVt) and CGt are endogenous and discussed in equations 2 and 3. Other right hand side variables 
characterize risk features, financial features, asset features, market features and firm features and are 
discussed below. 
 
Loan loss reserves (LLRt): represent credit risk. Higher loan reserves imply conservative behavior of the 
firm’s management to overcome credit risk. Hence hypothesis of positive sign on the estimated coefficient is 
plausible.  
 
Tier-1 Capital (CARt): represents capital risk. Higher tier-1 capital implies a conservative regulatory 
requirement to overcome capital risk. Hence hypothesis of positive sign on the estimated coefficient is 
plausible.  
 
Profitability (ROAAt): Profitability is measures as return on average asset. This determinant represents 
financial characteristics of the firms. The sign on this determinant is mixed. Positive sign implies firms have 
resources to implement ERM initiatives. Negative sign implies that adoption of ERM entailed significant capital 
expenditure resulting in reduced profitability.  
 
Market-Book (MBt) ratio: This determinant represents market characteristics of banks. A positive sign is 
expected on the estimated coefficient representing the fact that investors value favorably the firms adopting 
ERM as risk management strategy. 
 
Duration Gap (DGt)6: A positive sign on this coefficient is expected signifying that the banks adopting duration 
gap measures represent actively participating in ERM activities. 
Sizet: Firm size is measured by the natural log of the book value of assets. Survey evidence suggests that 
larger firms are more likely to engage in ERM because they are more complex, face a wider array of risks, and 
have the institutional size to support the administrative cost of an ERM program (see, e.g., Colquitt, Hoyt, and 
Lee, 1999; Hoyt, Merkley, and Thiessen, 2001; Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson, 2005; Standard & Poor's, 
2005).  
 
Leverage (DEt): Leverage is measured as the ratio of liability to total equity (D:E). Firms engaging in ERM 
may have lower financial leverage if they have decided to lower their probability of financial distress by 
decreasing financial risk. However, firms may decide that as a result of ERM they are able to assume greater 
financial risk. Accordingly, Pagach and Warr (2010) posit that the relation between ERM adoption and leverage 
is unclear. 
  
                                                          
5 Data collection is limited to the 8-year period from 2004 to 2011 in BANKSCOPE database (as the earliest evidence of ERM activity in 
GCC is in 2004). This sample comprised of 160 financial institutions that operated in any year during the 8-year period. 
6 Measurement of DGt is explained in Table 1.  
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Opaquet: Pottier and Sommer (2006) explain that relatively "opaque" firms are those that are harder for 
outsiders to evaluate. Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) argue that firms that are relatively more opaque should 
derive greater benefit from ERM programs that communicate risk management objectives and strategies to 
outsiders. Pagach and Warr (2010) hypothesize that ERM adoption is related to the opacity of a firm's assets 
because assets that are relatively more opaque are more difficult to liquidate in order to avert financial distress. 
We measure opacity as the ratio of intangible assets to the book value of total assets & hypothesize a positive 
relation between opaque and ERM, due to the fact that more opaque firms have illiquid asset structure and 
thus are more prone to enterprise risk exposure. 
 
CVNIt: is the coefficient of variation of net income (NI). This determinant represents risk characteristics. Firms 
that are relatively more volatile are likely to benefit from the effects of an ERM program. However, firms that 
have adopted ERM programs are likely to experience lower volatility of stock returns or earnings. Thus, the 
direction of the relation is ambiguous. 
  
Slackt (Liquidity): Slack implies financial liquidity and is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to total assets. ERM firms may have higher levels of financial slack due to an emphasis of risk 
management on reducing the probability of financial distress. ERM users may also be able to reduce the level 
of financial slack because of improved risk management (Pagach and Warr (2010)). Thus, the direction of the 
relation is ambiguous. 
 
Diverset (Diversification):  Diversification in business is also likely to affect whether a firm adopts an ERM 
program or not. Theory suggests that diversification is associated with both costs and benefits. On the one 
hand, diversification may be performance enhancing due to the benefits associated with scope economies, 
larger internal capital markets, and risk reduction (Lewellen, 1971, Teece, 1980). On the other hand, 
diversification may reduce performance if it exacerbates agency costs and leads to inefficient cross-
subsidization of poorly performing businesses (Easterbrook, 1984; Berger and Ofek, 1995) and thus increases 
potential for ERM. To control the effect of diversification on ERM, we use a dummy variable (DIVERSE) equal 
to 1 for firms that report diversified operations. We expect a mixed sign relation between diversification and 
ERM. 
 
Equation 2 - Firm Value (FV or Tobin’s Q) Determinants & Hypotheses 
The second equation FVt in the system is modeled as below: 
FVt =  a21 +  b22 CGt  + b23 ERMt + b24 Growtht + b25 ROAAt + b26 DIVPMTt + b27 
DEt + b28 Sizet + b2,9 Efficiencyt + b2,10 MBt+ ε2t 
 
Governance (CGt):  This is an endogenous variable in CG equation. Good governance requires the board to 
constantly monitor the firm to ensure growth in the firm value to protect the interests of the shareholders. We 
measure CG as the number of members in the BOD. A positive sign is expected between the firm value and 
CG. 
 
ERMt: ERM is an endogenous variable in the system. 
 
Growtht: Allayannis and Weston (2001) control for the effect of growth opportunities on Tobin's Q using the 
ratio of R&D expenditure to sales, or capital expenditure to assets. Due to the missing data for the majority of 
sample firms, historical yearly asset growth is used as a proxy for future growth opportunities. A positive 
relation is hypothesized between asset growth and Tobin’s Q. 
 
Profitability (ROAAt): It is quite natural that profitable firms are likely to trade at a premium. To control for firm 
profitability, return on average assets (ROAA) is included in the model. ROAA is calculated as net income 
divided by average asset in t and t-1. We expect a positive relation between ROAA and Tobin's Q. 
Dividend payment (DIVPMTt): Following Lang and Stulz (1994), dividend payment indicator is included that 
equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend in the current year. On the one hand, investors may view a disbursement 
of cash in the form of a dividend as a sign that the firm has exhausted its growth opportunities. If this holds 
then the payment of dividends will negatively affect firm value. On the other hand, to the extent that dividends 
reduce free cash flow that could be used for managerial perquisite consumption, the payment of dividends is 
expected to positively affect firm value. Thus, the expected sign is ambiguous. 
 
Leverage (DEt): To control for the relation between capital structure and firm value we include a leverage 
variable that is equal to the ratio of the book value of liabilities to the market value of equity. On the one hand, 
financial leverage enhances firm value to the extent that it reduces free cash flow that might otherwise have 
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been invested by managers with self-interest in suboptimal projects (Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, 
excessive leverage can increase the probability of financial distress and cause the firm's owners to bear 
financial distress costs. Thus, the predicted sign on this variable is ambiguous. 
 
Sizet: It is important to control size in the analysis as ERM indicator which is endogenous may proxy for firm 
size. Large firms are more likely to have ERM programs in place (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). On the other 
hand, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a significant negative relation between 
size and firm value. We use natural log of assets to control for size-related variation in Tobin's Q. Thus, the 
predicted sign on this variable is ambiguous. 
 
Efficiencyt: Earlier studies used a variety of cost efficiency measures as performance measures (He, Sommer 
and Xie (2011)). We derive constant returns to scale cost efficiency scores from stochastic frontier efficiency 
modelling. The predicted sign on this variable is ambiguous. On the one hand, cost efficiency could enhance 
firm value which is plausible. On the other hand, excessive cost efficiency can decrease non-implementation 
of potential growth opportunities available to firms due to focus on cost efficiency. Thus, the predicted sign on 
this variable is ambiguous. 
 
Market-Book (MBt) ratio: This determinant represents market characteristics of financial institutions. A 
positive sign is expected on the estimated coefficient representing the fact that investor views the financial 
institutions with a favorable MB ratio as higher performing firm. This variable is measured as Market price of 
the firm’s stock to Equity. A positive sign is hypothesized. 
 
Equation 3 - Corporate Governance Determinants & Hypotheses 
 
The third equation CGt in the system is modeled as below: 
CGt =  a31 + b32 LISTt + b33 ACt  + b34 Growtht + b35 FVt + b36 ERMt + b37 DIVERSEt + ε3t 
 
Listing (LISTt): SOX Act identifies corporate governance best practices that are required to be followed by 
publicly listed companies. Hence a positive sign on the estimated coefficient is expected of the listed 
companies signifying good governance. LIST is an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm is listed in the local or 
regional financial market. 
 
Audit Committee (ACt): Consistent with SOX Act, number of members in the audit committee in the BOD 
features active corporate governance. A positive sign on the estimated coefficient is thus expected between 
AC and Corporate Governance. 
 
Growtht: In terms of governance, active governance is concerned with stockholder value which requires firms 
to be growing concern at all times. Hence positive sign on the estimated coefficient is posited.  
Firm Value (FVt): is endogenous in the system of equations. Good governance requires the board to 
constantly monitor the firm to ensure consistent growth in the firm value to add value to the shareholders’ 
wealth.  
 
ERMt: This is also endogenous in the system. 
  
DIVERSEt (Diversification): Generally, the firm’s BOD desires a diversified business to mitigate enterprise 
risk to shareholders. On the other hand, diversification may also reduce firm’s performance due to higher 
capital costs for diversification. To control the effect of diversification on Corporate Governance, we use a 
dummy variable (DIVERSE) equal 1 for firms that report multiple activities in its operations. We expect a mixed 
relation between diversification and Corporate Governance. Finally, 2008-year dummy is included in all the 
three equations as a control for the crisis year in GCC in general and UAE in particular (UAE-2008).  
Table 1 summarizes the definition of variables and aforesaid hypotheses. 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Eq.# Coeffi
- 
cient 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Hypothesis (Sign in 
relation to the 
function) 
ERM  Risk -Mgmt List of conditions indicated in the table under section 3.1 Endogenous 
 b12 FV Firm value measured through Tobin-Q + 
 
b13 CG 
Corporate Governance measured as the existence of BOD in 
the firm 
+ 
http://dx.doi.org/10.30585/irabml.v1i1.66 
© 2018 the Authors. International Review of Advances in Business, Management and Law 1(2), 2018  
Page | 41  
 b14 LLR Loan loss reserve (Non-performing loant to Gross Loant) + 
 b15 CAR Capital adequacy ratio Tier-1 Capital to Total Capital  + 
 b16 ROAA Net incomet ÷ Average of Assett and Assett-1 -/+ 
 b17 MB Market to book ratio = Market pricet ÷ Equityt + 
 
b18 DG 
Duration gap = [Δ Interest earnings in t & t-1 - Δ Interest 
expenses in t & t-1] ÷ [Total Assetst] 
+ 
 b19 Size Natural logarithm of total assetst + 
 
b1,10 
LEVERAG
E 
Debt to equity (Liabilityt  to Total Equityt) -/+ 
 b1,11 Opaque Intangible assetst ÷ Assetst + 
 b1,12 CVNI Coefficient of variation of net incomet -/+ 
 b1,13 Slack Cash & Short-term investmentst ÷ Assetst -/+ 
 b1, 14 DIVERSE Indicator 1=diversified activities, 0 otherwise -/+ 
FV –
Tobin Q 
 Firm value (Market value of equityt + Liabilityt )÷Total Assetst Endogenous 
 
b22 CG 
Corporate Governance – Number of members in the BOD and 
presence of various committee including Audit Committee 
Endogenous 
 b23 ERM List of conditions indicated in the table under section 3.1 Endogenous 
 b24 Growth (Assett – Assett-1) ÷ Assett-1 + 
 b25 ROAA Net incomet ÷ Average of Assett and Assett-1 - 
 
b26 DIVPMT 
Dividend payment – Indicator variable 1 if the firm paid dividend 
in the year or 0 otherwise. 
-/+ 
 
b27 
LEVERAG
E 
Debt to equity (Liabilityt  to Total Equityt) 
-/+ 
 b28 Size Natural logarithm of total assetst -/+ 
 
b2,9 Efficiency 
Constant returns to scale efficiency measure obtained from 
stochastic frontier analysis 
-/+ 
 b2,10 MB Market to book ratio = Market pricet ÷ Equityt + 
CG 
 Governance 
Corporate Governance – Number of members in the BOD and 
presence of various committee including Audit Committee 
Endogenous in the 
System 
 
b32 LIST 
Indicator variable =1 if listed in the local/regional financial 
market 
+ 
 b33 AC Number of members in the audit committee + 
 b34 Growth (Assett – Assett-1) ÷ Assett-1 + 
 b35 Firm value (Market value of equityt + Liabilityt )÷Total Assetst Endogenous 
 b36 ERM List of conditions indicated in the table under section 3.1 Endogenous 
 b37 DIVERSE Indicator 1=diversified activities, 0 otherwise + 
 
Preliminary Results  
Summary statistics of the variables used in the study are reported in Table 2.  
 
Table.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Skewness 
2008 0.125 0.331 2.266 
LIST 0.659 0.474 -0.672 
BAHRAIN 0.253 0.435 1.137 
KSA 0.989 0.299 2.685 
KUWAIT 0.165 0.371 1.805 
OMAN 0.121 0.326 2.324 
UAE 0.264 0.441 1.072 
QATAR 0.099 0.299 2.685 
DIVERSE 0.319 0.466 0.778 
BOD 6.846 6.549 0.898 
AC 0.736 1.406 1.543 
GGL 21.04 48.089 4.081 
NPL-GL 7.817 13.475 3.948 
TIER1-CAP 19.304 15.435 5.352 
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ROAA 2.852 7.075 -1.015 
DIV.PAYOUT 43.191 51.474 6.793 
PB 2.11 2.39 6.678 
TOBIN-Q 2.083 24.489 24.47 
ERM 0.757 0.429 -1.197 
SLACK 0.306 0.237 1.229 
DG 0.028 1.966 0.185 
CRSESE 0.226 0.162 1.701 
LNTA 14.818 1.777 -0.189 
CVNI 0.953 3.807 0.947 
LEVERAGE 0.735 0.227 -1.586 
DE 12.051 117.238 16.639 
OPAQUE 0.014 0.022 5.259 
UAE2008 0.033 0.179 5.228 
 
As generally expected, most of the variables are positively skewed and few are negatively skewed indicating 
non-normality of the set of determinants in the system of equations. 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of all the determinants in the system of equations. The general lack of 
high correlation between the independent variables suggests that Multicollinearity is not a problem in this 
study. 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of financial institutions in the GCC used in this study.  
 
Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Financial Institutions (FI) (Total # 160 in GCC) 
Country NBFC CB IB Total 
FI 
ID Listed BOD 
Bahrain 38 25 41 31 26 19 30 
KSA 13 10 10 10 13 11 11 
Kuwait 33 17 18 20 30 27 20 
Oman 8 12 - 8 4 10 11 
UAE 4 26 20 22 21 25 19 
Qatar 4 10 10 9 6 8 9 
Total 14 56 30 100 28 58 75 
Index:  
NBFC: Non-Banking Finance 
Companies 
ID: FI whose operations are Internationally 
diversified 
CB: Commercial banks Listed: FI who are listed on country’s stock 
exchanges 
IB: Islamic Banks BOD: FI who were governed by BOD 
FI: Financial Institutions  
 
 
Out of 160 sample financial institutions in the GCC, 31% were in Bahrain followed by 22% in UAE, and 20% 
in Kuwait. 56% of financial institutions were commercial banks followed by 30% Islamic banks. 28% of the 
financial institutions were having diversified operations of which maximum diversification was seen in Kuwait 
(30%) followed by Bahrain (26%) and UAE (21%) with Qatar and Oman being least diversified internationally. 
58% of the financial institutions were listed on respective country’s stock exchange, of which Kuwait had 
maximum listed financial institutions (27%) followed by UAE (25%), and Bahrain (19%). Interestingly 75% of 
the financial institutions were being governed by BOD with Bahrain topping the list (30%), followed by Kuwait 
(20%), and UAE (19%). This indicates that all listed financial institutions in GCC do not necessarily have BOD 
(for example Kuwait and UAE) while few of non-listed FI were also governed by BOD (for example Bahrain, 
Oman and Qatar).  
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LIST BH KSA KW OMAN UAE QATAR DIVERSE BOD AC GGL NPL-GL TIER1 ROAA DIV PB TQ SLACK DG CRSESE LNTA CVNI LEV DE OPAQUE UAE*8
2008 0.045 -0.021 0.055 -0.031 0 0.011 -0.038 -0.024 -0.002 -0.027 0.214 -0.056 -0.053 0.109 -0.04 0.074 0.127 0.064 -0.02 0.069 -0.02 0.02 0.066 0.134 -0.073 0.471
LIST 1 0.045 0.067 0.038 0.041 -0.196 0.039 0.098 0.142 0.083 0.095 -0.023 0.069 0.056 0.003 0.075 0.104 0.131 0.024 -0.223 -0.202 0.034 -0.085 -0.124 0.033 0.021
BH 1 -0.251 -0.141 -0.15 -0.228 -0.146 -0.059 0.273 0.245 -0.088 0.324 0.029 -0.35 0.057 -0.14 -0.17 0.398 0.106 0.201 -0.156 0.016 0.028 0.086 0.112 -0.079
KSA 1 -0.213 -0.23 -0.343 -0.219 -0.068 0.005 -0.086 -0.029 -0.211 -0.028 0.154 -0.24 0.257 0.435 0.471 -0.07 0.182 0.384 -0.151 0.119 -0.182 -0.067 -0.118
KW 1 -0.13 -0.194 -0.124 0.347 -0.162 -0.263 -0.101 0.177 -0.096 -0.09 0.028 0.261 0.105 -0.03 0.05 0.026 0.044 0.562 0.185 -0.105 -0.119 -0.067
OMAN 1 -0.211 -0.135 -0.014 0.171 0.3 0.038 0.006 -0.002 -0.01 0.157 -0.08 -0.08 -0.22 -0.08 -0.338 -0.379 -0.081 -0.025 -0.042 0.027 -0.073
UAE 1 -0.199 -0.024 -0.361 -0.349 0.178 -0.117 0.113 0.138 -0.17 -0.23 -0.29 -0.53 0.008 -0.036 0.023 -0.138 -0.17 0.284 0.024 0.344
QATAR 1 -0.132 0.156 0.264 0.067 -0.083 -0.049 0.075 0.317 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 0.006 -0.102 -0.046 -0.083 -0.124 -0.075 0.026 -0.069
DIVERSE 1 -0.067 -0.014 -0.059 0.099 -0.093 -0.15 0.013 0.114 0.044 0.189 0.008 0.294 0.335 0.22 0.135 -0.111 -0.019 -0.044
BOD 1 0.834 0.043 -0.026 0.079 -0.07 0.052 -0.05 -0.07 0.141 -0.04 0.004 -0.089 0.089 -0.009 -0.023 -0.048 -0.114
AC 1 0.018 -0.022 -0.049 -0.12 0.217 -0.09 -0.07 0.049 -0.08 0.016 -0.039 -0.097 0.006 -0.04 -0.013 -0.146
GGL 1 -0.216 0.037 0.139 -0.03 0.059 0.105 -0.2 -0.04 -0.067 -0.145 -0.027 -0.149 0.1 0.011 0.155
NPL-GL 1 0.279 -0.51 -0.02 0.001 -0.03 0.136 0.152 -0.178 -0.443 0.164 -0.367 -0.087 0.35 -0.084
TIER1 1 0.253 0.085 -0.2 0.057 -0.07 0.137 -0.439 -0.495 -0.062 -0.713 -0.039 0.092 0.007
ROAA 1 0.203 -0.11 0.204 -0.22 -0.21 -0.222 0.089 -0.068 -0.009 -0.022 -0.253 0.125
DIV 1 -0.19 -0.13 -0.06 -0.12 -0.252 -0.211 -0.084 -0.153 -0.049 -0.012 -0.049
PB 1 0.595 0.175 0.01 0.384 0.096 0.313 0.253 -0.235 -0.049 -0.056
TQ 1 0.285 0.042 0.022 -0.019 -0.004 -0.046 -0.376 0.187 -0.055
SLACK 1 -0.02 0.409 0.239 0.129 0.119 -0.133 0.041 -0.183
DG 1 -0.086 -0.104 0.009 -0.225 0.013 0.203 0.065
CRSESE 1 0.636 0.197 0.602 0.041 -0.235 -0.079
LNTA 1 0.062 0.608 0.079 -0.369 -0.068
CVNI 1 0.232 -0.018 -0.241 -0.048
LEV 1 0.101 -0.459 -0.046
DE 1 -0.109 0.419
OPAQUE 1 -0.044
Table 3 Correlation Matric of 3SLS Model Determinants 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 5 reports results of OLS (Model-1)7 and 3SLS (Model-2) for GCC financial institutions in relation to UAE. 
Most of the coefficients were highly significant in 3SLS compared to single equation (Model-1). Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC)8 was generally lower in all three equations in Model-2 compared to Model 1, 
signifying gain in efficiency in joint estimation as conceptualized in the framework (figure-1). Also, the covariance 
of error terms is non-zero in 3SLS confirming that the system of equations is jointly interdependent. Thus our 
framework is plausible and first null hypothesis is validated. That is, it is not true that ERM &CG initiatives are 
not jointly undertaken by the firm, implying there is simultaneity in adopting these initiatives by the BOD. 
Therefore, the discussion is focused on 3SLS model results.  
 
Table 5. Model results (GCC) 
Variable Coefficient T-stat   Coefficient T-stat 
  Model-1 (GCC-OLS)   Model-2 (GCC-3SLS) 
1. ERM Equation 
Constant .6241 5.11  2.6979 9.44 
FV (Firm Value) -.0003 -.89  .0004 .93 
BOD (Corporate 
Governance) .0014 .99  
.0046*** 2.75 
2008 .0176 .63  .0391 1.19 
Bahrain .0072 .28  -.1393*** -4.23 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia -.0819*** -2.45  -.0109 -.27 
Kuwait .0355 1.23  -.0254 -.74 
Oman 0.0407 1.34  -.1320*** -3.37 
Qatar 0.0024 0.08  -.1113*** -2.86 
NPL/GL  0.0003*** 11.17  .0004*** 11.86 
Tier-1 Cap  0.0008*** 2.92  .0003*** 6.95 
ROAA  -0.0009 -0.71  -.0003*** -2.03 
MB  0.0005*** 2.42  .0007*** 3.12 
DG -0.0005*** -2.01  -.0002 -.81 
LNTA 0.0163** 1.84  -.1203*** -6.26 
LEVERAGE 0.1117** 1.85  .2426*** 3.38 
OPAQUE -0.3953*** -4.89  -.2818*** -3.03 
CVNI 0.0083*** 3.58  .0151*** 5.474 
SLACK 0.2679*** 5.66  .1613*** 2.93 
DIVERSE -0.0329** -1.75  .0538** 2.29 
UAE2008 -0.1178** -2.17  -.1578*** -2.49 
 AIC (Akaike Info Criteria) -3.07  -2.74 
 Likelihood ratio statistical 
significance Chi2 
1042.13  802.36 
2. Firm Value (FV-Tobin-Q) Equation 
Constant -13.9008 -3.31  -18.6144 -4.29 
2008 -1.8809 -0.647  -1.8223 -.63 
Bahrain 2.3529 0.896  2.0751 .79 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia -1.5636 -0.473  -1.7519 -.534 
Kuwait 0.4744 0.168  .4709 .169 
Oman 0.5387 0.173  .0366 .01 
Qatar -0.3302 -0.103  -.5443 -.17 
BOD (Corporate 
Governance) 0.0529 0.359  
.1435 .98 
ERM FUNCTION 1.0697 0.306  4.9499 1.39 
GGL  -0.0132*** -3.797  -.0135*** -3.95 
                                                          
7 The disadvantage of single equation modelling of firm value (Tobin's Q) as a function of ERM and other value determinants is that, it 
ignores potential selectivity bias that arises due to the likely endogeneity of ERM choice. In other words, some of the factors that are 
correlated with the firm's choice to adopt ERM may also be correlated with observed differences in Tobin Q. To deal with this potential 
endogeneity bias, we use a maximum-likelihood treatment in 3SLS model that jointly estimates the decision to engage in ERM and the 
effect of that decision on Tobin’s Q in a system of equations.  
8 Lower AIC (Akaike Information Criteria) is preferred for model selection. 
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ROAA  0.0065 0.45  .0066 .47 
Div payout  -0.0036* -1.652  -.0035* -1.66 
DE -0.0047 -0.499  -.0041 -.44 
LNTA 0.9913*** 69.374  .9883*** 70.02 
CRSESE 0.0035 1.402  .0029 1.21 
UAE2008 -0.0561 -0.01  .8124 .144 
MB  0.0071 0.737  .0056 .59 
AIC (Akaike Info Criteria) 6.22  6.19 
 Likelihood ratio statistical 
significance Chi2 
4148.19  4163.32 
3. Corporate Governance (CG) Equation 
Constant 3.2937 5.506  2.3019 3.79 
2008 -0.1419 -0.284  -.1778 -.36 
Bahrain 1.8380*** 4.101  1.7987*** 4.03 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2.2339*** 4.042  2.1368*** 3.89 
Kuwait 2.2756*** 4.813  2.2700*** 4.84 
Oman 1.0951*** 2.041  1.0201** 1.91 
Qatar -0.2638 -0.471  -.3713 -.67 
UAE2008 -0.1356 -0.14  -.0269 -.03 
LIST 0.8276*** 2.226  .4533 1.24 
AC  3.4265*** 26.868  3.4213*** 27.20 
GGL  0.0006 1.134  .0004 .76 
Tobin Q  0.0009 1.353  .0009 .13 
ERM 0.2763 0.484  1.7239*** 3.03 
DIVERSE -1.7674*** -5.626  -1.7761*** -5.71 
AIC (Akaike Info Criteria) 2.69  2.68 
 Likelihood ratio statistical 
significance Chi2 
801.96  809.3 
*** Significant at α=1%;  ** Significant at α=5%; * Significant at α=10% 
 
Variance – Covariance of system errors (GCC) 
Equation
s 
4 5 6  4B 5B 6B 
1  0.21
3 
   0.0629 -.6124 -.2218 
2  22.15
7 
   480.85 -3.131 
3   3.809    14.369 
 
5.1 ERM Initiative  
Relative to UAE, financial institutions in Bahrain, Oman and Qatar adopted ERM initiative less vigorously during 
the study period. This observation is statistically highly significant. During crisis period (2008) the ERM adoption 
in UAE decreased by around 0.16% and was statistically highly significant. Firm value did not significantly impact 
adoption of ERM initiative in GCC firms. However, active CG had a significant positive impact on adoption of 
ERM initiative in GCC firms. 
 
As hypothesized, ERM function is positively related to loan loss reserves, Tier-1 Capital, market price to book 
ratio, leverage, variability in net income, slack (liquidity) and diversity of operations.  Of these significant 
determinants, leverage, slackness (or liquidity), diversification and variability of earnings had higher magnitude 
of positive impact on ERM initiative. 
 
A one percent increase in leverage triggered ERM adoption by 0.24%. This is consistent with the finding of 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) that firms with greater financial leverage are more likely to adopt ERM. 
 
A one percent increase in liquidity (slack) triggered ERM adoption by around 0.16%. This is consistent with the 
findings of Pagach and Warr (2010) who argue that ERM users may have higher levels of financial slack due to 
the emphasis on risk management for reducing the probability of financial distress.  
 
A one percent increase in diversity of operations triggered ERM adoption by 0.05%. As hypothesized, diversified 
firms face a more complex range of risks than do undiversified firms. In the current study, the negative relation 
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may point to the fact that diversification may reduce performance as it exacerbates agency costs and leads to 
inefficient cross-subsidization of poorly performing businesses and thus increases potential for ERM initiative. 
 
A one percent increase in variability in net income triggered ERM adoption by 0.015%. Firms that are relatively 
more volatile are likely to benefit from the effects of an ERM program. 
 
The magnitude of positive impact of following determinants was less on ERM initiative although they were 
statistically significant. 
 
A one percent increase in loan loss reserve ratio in gross loan triggered ERM adoption by 0.00042%. A higher 
loan reserve represents conservative behavior of financial institutions to overcome credit risk and hence this 
positive relation is plausible. 
 
A one percent increase in tier-1 capital ratio triggered ERM adoption by 0.00026%. Higher tier-1 capital 
represents a conservative regulatory requirement to overcome capital risk. Hence hypothesis of positive sign 
on the estimated coefficient is plausible. 
 
A one percent increase in market price to book ratio triggered ERM adoption by 0.0007%. This represents the 
fact that investors value favourably the financial institutions that adopt ERM as risk management strategy. 
 
The degree of ERM adoption was higher due to the prevailing risk determinants such as leverage risk, liquidity 
risk, diversity of operations, and variability of net income, and to a lesser extent by default risk and capital risk 
in the financial institutions in GCC.  
 
ERM function was significantly negatively related to opaqueness, size, and profitability of financial institutions 
in GCC. Unexpectedly the opaque variable showed negative relation implying that, relative to UAE other 
financial institutions in GCC with less intangible assets (less opaque) in their asset structure adopted ERM in 
their operations more vigorously compared to financial institutions with large intangible assets. A 1% reduction 
in opaqueness of financial institutions improved ERM adoption by 0.2818%.  This finding is also in contrast to 
Pagach and Warr (2010) who stated that ERM adoption is related to the opacity of a firm's assets because 
assets that are relatively more opaque are more difficult to liquidate in order to avert financial distress. 
 
The size variable also showed negative relation and were highly significant probably implying that small size 
GCC firms adopted ERM in their operations more vigorously compared to large size financial institutions. A 1% 
reduction in the size (in assets) of financial institutions improved ERM adoption by 0.12%. This finding is in 
contrast to the survey evidence that larger firms are more likely to engage in ERM because they are more 
complex, face a wider array of risks, and have the institutional size to support the administrative cost of an ERM 
program (Colquitt, Hoyt, and Lee, 1999; Hoyt, Merkley, and Thiessen, 2001; Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson, 
2005; Standard & Poor's, 2005). Similarly, a one percent increase in profitability of operations triggered 
reduction in ERM adoption by 0.0003%, implying that adoption of ERM entailed significant capital expenditure 
resulting in reduced profitability.  
 
5.2 Firm Value (FV) Function  
Equation 2 in Table 5 explains the firm value function of GCC financial institutions. Consistent with the 
framework (Figure 1), the ERM & CG initiative has a joint positive impact on firm value in GCC although they 
were statistically less significant.   
 
Firm value also increased with the size of financial institutions. A one percent increase in the size of financial 
institutions increased the firm value by 0.988% and was statistically very significant. However, Lang and Stulz 
(1994) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a significantly negative relation between size and firm value in 
their studies. 
 
Unexpectedly, firm value was negatively related to growth of GCC financial institutions. A one percent increase 
in growth rate of financial institutions reduced the firm value by 0.0135% and was highly significant. One can 
however argue that, increased growth rate might imply potential future growth opportunities in time t+1 for which 
the firm has to commit funds in time t, with the result there is reduced capital available in time t for firm’s 
operations and hence firm value is reduced in time t.  
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A one percent increase in dividend payout also decreased the firm value by 0.0035% and was statistically 
significant at 6% level. This is plausible since investors may view a disbursement of cash in the form of a 
dividend as a sign that GCC firms have exhausted their growth opportunities and hence the payment of 
dividends will negatively affect firm value.  
 
Other determinants such as Profitability, Leverage, Cost efficiency of operations, Market price to book ratio and 
distress period in UAE (UAE-2008) were not significant determinants of firm value of GCC financial institutions. 
 
5.3 Corporate Governance (CG) Initiative  
Equation 3 in Table 5 explains the CG initiative in GCC financial institutions. The results suggest that corporate 
governance mechanism was active in financial institutions in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman relative 
to UAE financial institutions. While the listing of financial institutions in GCC did not significantly impact 
governance of GCC financial institutions, the existence of audit committees shows a significant positive impact 
on the governance of GCC financial institutions. Economic crisis in UAE in 2008 did not impact CG initiative of 
GCC financial institutions.  
 
Interestingly, ERM adoption in GCC financial institutions has shown a significant positive influence on 
governance mechanism in GCC. A one percent increase in ERM initiative impacted corporate governance of 
GCC financial institutions by 1.7239%. This is statistically highly significant. This result implies that GCC firms’ 
BOD derived greater benefits from ERM adoption in their firms. 
 
As expected, CG initiative was positively impacted by existence of audit committees in the BOD of GCC financial 
institutions. A 1% increase in existence of audit committees resulted in around 3.42% improvement in CG 
initiative. SOX Act identifies existence of audit committee in the BOD as a good feature of active governance. 
To that extent the system model results indicate that consistent with SOX Act, GCC financial institutions 
exhibited active corporate governance.  
 
The governance was however highly significantly and negatively related to diversity of operations of GCC 
financial institutions. A one percent increase in diversity of operations in GCC financial institutions outside the 
GCC borders reduced governance efficacy by around 1.78 percent. This is plausible since diversification may 
increase agency costs and lead to inefficient cross-subsidization of poorly performing businesses (Easterbrook, 
1984; Berger and Ofek, 1995), due to the prevailing economic uncertainty in neighboring Arab countries owing 
to Arab Spring. Other variables such as Growth, and Firm Value did not impact CG of GCC financial institutions.  
 
In summary, the results in Table 5 and non-zero covariance of error terms across three equations rejects the 
null hypothesis that the Equations (1), (2) and 3 are independent and supports endogeneity of ERM, CG 
initiatives on firm values through their joint estimation. Thus, the second research null hypothesis is not true 
i.e., independence between firm value, CG and ERM initiatives is not true. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
 
 
6.1.  Conclusions 
One of the major challenges facing researchers is how to identify firms that engage in ERM & CG that add value 
to the firms. The study designs a framework (figure 1) to model the simultaneity and jointness of Corporate 
Governance, ERM decisions on Firm Value, and to provide empirical evidence on the quantitative and joint 
impact of ERM & CG initiatives on firm value of financial institutions in GCC. In the absence of explicit disclosure 
of ERM implementation & CG initiatives, we use an indicator variable for a variety of “if” conditions for proxying 
ERM & CG. For ERM, the alternative condition is any one of the stated condition namely: if the financial firm 
has various committees (including audit committee) in the BOD (BOD); if the financial firm has derivative 
products under assets/liabilities; if the financial firm maintains a positive reserve ratio of non-performance loans 
to gross loans; if the financial firm has tier-1 Capital Adequacy Ratio greater than 4%. CG initiative is similarly 
modeled as an indicator variable if there is presence of audit committees in the BOD, existence of decisions on 
dividend payment by the BOD, and if the firms are publicly listed; all these conditions reflect components of 
active corporate governance mechanism. Tobin-Q measure proxies Firm value in GCC.  
 
The hypotheses that there exists simultaneity and endogeneity in corporate governance (through CG and ERM 
initiatives) and firm value are tested through modelling a system of 3SLS equation system. The non-zero cross 
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equation error confirms that the system of three equations is interdependent and there was simultaneity in CG, 
ERM and Firm Value determinants.  Lower Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), Likelihood ratio test with highly 
significant Chi2 values further confirm the endogeneity of CG, ERM and Firm Value determinants. 
 
3SLS results indicate that relative to UAE, financial institutions in Bahrain, Oman and Qatar significantly less 
rigorously adopted ERM initiative during 2004-2011. During 2008 crisis period the ERM adoption in UAE 
decreased by 0.16% and was statistically highly significant. 
 
ERM was significantly dependent on: Risk Characteristics (measured by variance in net income or variance in 
market price per share); Financial characteristics (measured by Leverage, Cash availability (slack), Profitability); 
Asset characteristics (measured by opaque (intangible) assets in total assets, growth options), Market 
characteristics (measured by Market to Book ratio); and Firm risk characteristics (measured by Tier-1 Capital, 
Loan loss reserve, Market to book ratio). Firm value was dependent on: Growth, Dividend pay-out, and Size. 
Similarly, Corporate Governance (CG) was dependent on: ERM, Existence of Audit committee (in BOD), and 
diversity in operations. Of these significant determinants, higher magnitude of positive impact on ERM initiative 
was seen in leverage (0.24%), liquidity (0.16%), diversification (0.05%) and variability of earnings (0.015%). 
Loan loss reserves, tier-1 capital ratio and market to book price had statistically significant but very minor 
positive impact on ERM initiative. Unexpectedly, ERM initiative was significantly and negatively impacted by 
determinants such as less opaqueness (0.28%), size of the firm (0.12%) and profitability (0.0003%). 
 
The system model results further indicate that firm value is jointly and positively impacted by ERM & CG 
initiatives on GCC financial institutions although the impact was less statistically significant. Firm value did not 
significantly improve during 2004-11 in GCC countries. However, firm size was the only determinant that 
significantly and positively impacted (0.988%) firm value. Other determinants such as growth (0.0135%) and 
dividend pay-out (0.0035%) had a significant negative impact on firm value in GCC.  
 
Relative to UAE the corporate governance mechanism was active in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman 
firms. Further, the existence of audit committees in the GCC firm’s boards and ERM adoption showed significant 
positive impact on corporate governance by 3.42% and 1.7239% respectively in GCC. On the other hand, 
corporate governance mechanism was significantly less inclined to encourage diversity of firms’ operations as 
the GCC boards were more apprehensive that their efficacy would decline by around 1.78 for every 1 % increase 
in diversity of operations outside GCC borders. 
 
This study is possibly the first study to document the value relevance of ERM and CG initiatives on GCC firms’ 
value. This research analysis provides a starting point for additional research into ERM, Governance and Firm 
value in neighbouring AGCC, MEA and other developing economies. The vast majority of extant research takes 
the form of surveys. These studies are valuable as a source of descriptive information regarding ERM & CG 
use but do not answer the fundamental question of whether ERM & CG enhances firm value, which is addressed 
in this study using a reasonably good methodology and data set that are readily available to most researchers.  
 
6.2 Limitations 
Relatively small sample size, small GCC economies, and inability to measure the intensity of ERM & CG usage 
in GCC firms are some of the limitations in our study. These limitations may reduce the extent to which the 
results may be generalized. As such, additional research using larger samples by extending to AGCC (Arab 
GCC) countries and more refined ERM & CG measures would represent an important broader generalizable 
contribution to the emerging literature on ERM, CG and firm value.  
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